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Abstract A serious gap exists between science and disaster 
decision making, so that many scientific reports have little 
impact and fail to inform decision making. This article exam- 
ines the complex linkages between science and disaster 
reduction, analyzing the barriers that prevent more effective 
use of science and suggesting how the gap between science 
and decision making may be narrowed. 
Keywords decision making, disasters, risk assessment, 
science 
1 Introduction 
It is widely recognized that a serious gap exists between 
science and expert assessment on the one hand and decision 
making on the other. Major scientific reports relevant to deci- 
sion makers frequently pass unnoticed and decision makers 
remain largely unaware that scientific analyses have been 
conducted that may be highly relevant to their decision- 
making areas of responsibility. Decision makers often do 
not read scientific journals or academic books that regularly 
appear in their fields of interest, but there is substantial 
variability in this--between different issues of concern and 
among different countries. 
The notion that a linear process exists between science 
and policy still permeates the thinking of many scientists and 
decision makers, and so it is scientists operating in the realm 
of traditional science who largely determine how problems of 
science are defined, framed, and communicated to potential 
users. Predictably, this mode of framing the development of 
science addresses the need for greater scientific understand- 
ing within the scientific community rather than the needs of 
practitioners in their everyday decisions. In both the halls of 
science and even within governmental agencies, the goal is 
assumed to be the growth of scientific understanding of some 
issue of environment or science and then "outreach," often 
by posting results on a website, to prospective users. It is 
also commonplace that prospective users and decision 
makers do not follow scientific development on websites, 
so subsequently running through the motions of "outreach" 
rarely accomplishes the task of transmitting scientific results 
to those who could use them to inform decision making. 
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But the problems go well beyond the issues of effective 
dissemination and outreach. Political decisions, it has been 
widely noted, extend well beyond issues of science (Jasanoff 
1990; NRC 2009a). Inevitably, a host of other issues--cost 
and benefit considerations, impacts on industry, reduction of 
risk achieved, stakeholder views, distributional issues--enter 
into such decisions. If scientific and assessment studies 
encompass only the issues of science, they have limited value 
to prospective users who require a much broader range of 
considerations and knowledge. As a result, scientific results 
and assessments of risk and disasters are often not used 
because they have been defined and framed to meet the needs 
of science rather than the needs of those making decisions. 
To avert these problems, a different kind of scientific and 
assessment process is needed, one that begins with user needs 
and a problem-solving orientation (NRC 2009a). The com- 
munication among scientists, assessors, and users has greatest 
success when "inreach" as well as "outreach" is involved 
(NRC 2009b). Effective linkage between science and practice 
occurs not in a linear process of producers and consumers, but 
in a continuing two-way interaction in which learning occurs 
among both the scientists and assessors on the one hand and 
the practitioners who make decisions on the other, with a rich 
pattern of feedbacks the norm for both. 
2 Natural Disasters'A Continuing Toll 
The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction was 
launched in 2000 as a global strategy to build across the inter- 
national system "a culture of prevention" in multiple societies 
as part of a global effort to promote sustainable development. 
The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 was adopted to 
achieve this general goal at multiple scales--global, national, 
regional, and local. The Global Platform for Disaster Risk 
Reduction was adopted as the global forum to build the resil- 
ience of nations and communities for anticipating and coping 
with disasters. 
Despite these laudable efforts, the track record continues 
to show unrelenting problems. As Munich Re (Munich 
Reinsurance Company, one of the world's leading reinsurers) 
data show, while loss of life from natural disasters continues 
to decline, economic damages worldwide continue to grow. 
The first decade of the twenty-first century has experienced 
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some of the major disasters of the past 100 years. These have 
included typhoons in Asia, several major earthquakes in 
China, a devastating earthquake in Haiti, one of the world's 
poorest countries, and an environmental catastrophe from 
an oil spill in the United States, one of the world's richest 
countries. These events have demonstrated convincingly that 
despite major planning and financial investments across the 
globe, disaster risks continue to grow. This trend inevitably 
raises the question--is this a failing of science, a failure to 
incorporate science into decision-making, or a product of 
both? 
3 Bridges and Spiderwebs 
Language pervasively influences our thinking on problems 
and decision issues. This is pronounced in the case of linkage 
between science and practice. Rhetoric and writings are 
replete with references to the "bridge," "superhighway," and 
"pipeline" that connect science to practice. But it is abun- 
dantly clear that the linkage is anything but linear. First, it is 
clear that a wide cast of intermediaries, including corporate 
officials, federal agency personnel, state and local officials, 
and NGO leaders interpret and reframe the results of science 
for a broad host of decision makers (Moser and Dilling 2007). 
They do this, as pointed out in writings on the social amplifi- 
cation of risk (see, in particular, Pidgeon, Kasperson, and 
Slovic 2003), by emphasizing particular elements of the 
risk results and reframing the basic message of the inference 
to be drawn for risk and environmental management. A wide 
variety of stakeholders and actors compete in this arena for 
shaping the risk and other "signals" to decision makers 
(Pidgeon, Kasperson, and Slovic 2003). The net effect is to 
reframe the message and thereby "amplify" or "attenuate" the 
signal to society and decision makers of the social meaning of 
the risk event or research. 
Accordingly, language is needed that more accurately 
describes the linkage between science and practice. The 
author proposes the use of the term "spiderwebs" as a more 
accurate description of what actually occurs in at least the 
controversial disasters that become a matter of dispute and 
controversy. The image of a spiderweb is, of course, an 
imperfect image of a complex and often unstable network. 
Technically, the image of a "communal spiderweb" is prefer- 
able, with multiple spiders and a dynamic web of linkages. To 
provide a visual image of such a spiderweb, Figure 1 shows a 
hypothetical case of a linkage system, a spiderweb, between 
sciences and practice. This figure suggests a wide range of 
intermediaries who may be involved--the media, lobbyists, 
bloggers, NGOs, industry trade groups, and policy brokers. 
For the purpose of this discussion, science is treated as 
unitary, which of course it is not. A spectrum of decision 
makers is typically involved, ranging over public and private 
institutions, officials at different government scales, individ- 
ual resource managers, and individual interest groups and 
decision makers. 
Of course, there is no one model or image of the linkage 
system. But there are at least three major types of architecture 
to these spiderwebs. The first is the simple spiderweb, in 
which there is a high degree of direct linkage between science 
and the primary decision makers. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change is a good illustration of this type 
of architecture. Here, national governments suggest the 
members who will serve on the panel and participate in 
the final stage of report drafting in determining the actual 
language to be incorporated in the final text. The underlying 
issue--global climate change--is also an issue that requires 
involvement and consent by at least the major actors who are 
involved. The second type of spiderweb architecture is the 
complex but stable spiderweb. These spiderwebs show a more 
complex set of actors and less direct linkage between science 
and end users and decision makers. An example of this type 
of architecture is the nuclear proliferation treaty, in which 
there is a stable negotiating and regulatory institution--the 
International Atomic Energy Agency--but a complex prob- 
lem area (ability to make and deliver a nuclear weapon) and 
shifting national agendas and relationships. The structure 
of political interactions has some relatively stable power 
relationships and interests, but long-term technical and politi- 
cal uncertainties. The third type of spiderweb architecture is 
the complex, unstable spiderweb. Here the problem arena is 
complex, with interests, agenda, and actors that are often 
unstable. Network actors enter and drop out of the web from 
time to time. A notable example of this spiderweb architecture 
is the case of marine fisheries, with diffuse actors facing 
a rapidly deteriorating risk situation, a weak and unstable 
regulatory structure, and conflicting national priorities. 
Running through these different architectures are several 
important risk management challenges. How to build and 
maintain social trust across the diverse actors in the spider- 
web is a major need in producing an effective relationship 
between science and practice (Cvetkovich and L6fstedt 1999; 
Hardin 2006; Siegrist, Earle, and Gutscher 2007). If the 
spiderweb becomes more diffuse and contentious, as amplifi- 
cation and attenuation agents compete for control over the 
framing of the science results and the associated signals of 
the attached social meaning to society and decision makers, 
concerted action and "best" practices become more difficult 
to obtain. 
4 Boundary Organizations 
One major hypothesis has emerged to suggest how the gap 
between science and practice may be effectively narrowed. 
Organizations that sit astride the domains of research and 
user communities, it is argued, assure a greater potential for 
effective interaction and the production of knowledge more 
germane to the needs of decision makers. While the range 
of supporting empirical studies is thin and largely oriented 
to unitary decision makers in the Western context and to 
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram of a spiderweb in decision processes and public policies 
international governance regimes based on Western gover- 
nance notions, several important generalizations have 
emerged. Boundary organizations are most effective, studies 
contend (for example, Hellstrom and Jacob 2003), when: 
(1) they are situated at the frontier between science and 
politics, but have neutral accountability to each; 
(2) actors from both science and politics and intermediaries 
in the linkage space between them actively participate in 
interactions through the linkage domain; 
(3) they provide opportunities and incentives for the 
creation of shared instruments (for example, models or 
research plans) that facilitate collaborations and pursuit 
of natural interests; and, 
(4) they encourage the coproduction of information and 
analysis on behalf of both science and practice. 
A series of case studies has explored the role of boundary 
organizations in a range of empirical situations (Guston 1999; 
Agrawala, Broad, and Guston 2001; Cash 2001; Guston 2001; 
Carr and Wilkinson 2005). 
Despite this valuable work, questions remain. Nearly all 
studies have addressed only one of the three types of spider- 
web architecture--namely Type 1, the simple spiderweb, 
where both the research and practice domains tend to be 
unitary and connections are more direct and relatively stable. 
As yet, we have little empirical evidence drawn from more 
complex and dynamic spiderwebs where intermediaries are 
contentious, vie for power, and compete to define framings 
of the science or risk messages. Organizations may not, 
however, be the critical issue to begin with. What is most 
important may be the functions that are achieved and the 
processes that go forth. A formal structure or organization 
may well be less important than what its participants achieve, 
mainly efforts involving coproduction of knowledge, agreed- 
upon mutual accountability, mechanisms for jointly produced 
planning, analytical methods and models, and an arena for 
ongoing mediation on issues and objectives. Beyond this, we 
need to see how these processes can be obtained, and whether 
boundary organizations can be found or created in the more 
challenging spiderweb architectures, where actors are more 
diffuse, decision makers widely distributed, intermediaries 
shifting and in conflict, and media contribute to amplification 
and attenuation of the signals to decision makers and society 
more generally. 
One alternative concept, which emphasizes culture and 
informal processes rather than structure, is the notion of the 
epistemic community. In his work on the development of a 
plan to address pollution in the Mediterranean Basin, Haas 
(1990) charts the evolution of an interactive network of 
scientists and policy makers in conducting assessments 
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and formulating an integrative science and risk-management 
policy for the Mediterranean Basin. He calls particular atten- 
tion to the creation of extensive personal and professional 
linkages between scientists and practitioners in creating an 
overall holistic plan for addressing a wide variety of threats to 
environmental quality in the Basin. While organizational 
mechanisms evolved to facilitate both scientific assessments 
and policy deliberations, at base they rested upon the emer- 
gence of a knowledge system with a shared conception of 
problems and goals, levels of personal trust among key 
actors, and continuing adjudication of the tensions between 
science and policy. This analysis captures many of the ele- 
ments involved in the notion of a "boundary organization," 
but the focus is clearly on the emergence of a common 
knowledge system, shared goals, and ongoing negotiation in 
analysis and deliberation (see also Haas, Keohane, and Levy 
1993). 
5 Do We Need a Different Kind of 
Science 
A major suggestion arising over the last decade is that the 
principal problem in a more effective relationship between 
science and policy lies primarily in the area of science--that 
we need a new kind of science to narrow the gap between 
science and practice. On the eve of the millennium two major 
events occurred. The first was the publication of a landmark 
U. S. National Research Council (NRC 1999) report, Our 
Common Journey. This report highlighted the conclusion that 
"...tensions exist between integrative problem-driven 
research and research firmly grounded in particular disci- 
plines; and between the quest for generalizable scientific 
knowledge of sustainability issues and the localized knowl- 
edge of environment/society interactions that give rise to 
these issues and generate the options for dealing with them" 
(NRC 1999, 10). The National Research Council in a later 
report (NRC 2009a) identified a number of priority tasks for 
overcoming this tension: 
(1) develop a research framework that integrates global 
and local perspectives to shape a "place-based" under- 
standing between environment and society; 
(2) initiate focused research programs on a small set of 
understudied questions that are central to a deeper 
understanding of interactions between science and the 
environment; 
(3) promote better utilization of existing tools and processes 
for linking knowledge in action in pursuit of a transition 
to sustainability; 
(4) reorganize the program around integrated scientific- 
societal issues to facilitate cross-cutting research focused 
on understanding the interactions among the climate, 
human, and environmental systems and on supporting 
societal responses to climate change (NRC 2009a, 4); 
and 
(5) a strong underpinning of observations and models is 
needed, as well as strengthened research across the 
board--particularly in the human dimensions of global 
change and in user-driven (applied) research that sup- 
ports decision making--and increased involvement of 
stakeholders..." (NRC 2009a, 5). 
Such observations are not uncommon. Although it is abun- 
dantly clear that science is needed to inform decision making 
on the environmental challenges that face society, it is still 
the case across many societies that science is still conceived, 
and financially supported, as only the natural, medical, and 
engineering sciences. And so review of report after report 
in the United States continues the drumbeat for a more inte- 
grated concept of science. Meanwhile, the understanding of 
human interactions with environmental systems continues to 
lag badly behind what is needed in an adequate knowledge 
base to inform decisions in both the public and private 
sectors. These problems are deep-seated and unlikely to 
change anytime soon. The personnel and expertise in federal 
agencies and private corporations continue to share a paucity 
of social and behavioral science expertise involving such 
fields as psychology, sociology, anthropology, and geogra- 
phy. Only economics among the social sciences has won 
broad recognition and involvement. Until this long-standing 
deficit of expertise is rectified, the knowledge base for prac- 
tice will continue to have serious gaps and deficiencies that 
will limit the entrance of science into decision making about 
disasters and other risks. 
6 Do We Need a Different Kind of Policy 
and Decision Process 
Another view sees the problem as primarily in the decision- 
making arena. The rational model approach to decision 
making is often equated to "command-and-control" deci- 
sions, following a military model of addressing a problem or 
threat, conducting scientific assessments delineating the 
problem and options for dealing with it, and choosing that 
option which realizes the greatest gain, or utility, in terms of 
decision maker goals. This approach can be elaborated, 
though not fundamentally changed, by approaches of multi- 
objective decision making. Such conceptions rely heavily 
on assumptions of a unitary decision maker, not a distributed 
decision system, and requisite knowledge to realize decision 
objectives. But what do we do when uncertainties are very 
large, decision goals contested, and decision systems 
distributed and not unitary? This has led to some changed 
prescriptive views of policy--for example, that at least for 
certain kinds of risk decisions, such as those with large uncer- 
tainties but large irreversible damage--that precautionary 
decision making should replace rational, utility maximizing 
approaches (Harremo~s et al. 2002). 
For at least certain decision problems for which science is 
inherently limited in providing the information and analysis 
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needed to reach a traditional "good" rational decision based 
on strong scientific analysis, other approaches to decision 
making are receiving growing attention. Among these, recent 
discussions have taken up adaptive management as an effec- 
tive, and perhaps preferable, alternative to "command-and- 
control" management (Holling 1978; Folke et al. 2005; Renn 
and Walker 2008). Here the argument is for a "go with the 
flow" kind of decision making, one based on the notion that 
knowledge is evolutionary and that learning and incremental 
decision making, if well structured, can produce a more 
intelligent and successful management system over time. 
Certainly it can be better adapted to situations of emerging 
knowledge and large uncertainties than "command-and- 
control" approaches. Figure 2 shows the major differences in 
how these two decision processes are structured. 
But adaptive management may travel the same course as 
other corrupted concepts, such as "sustainability." It is now 
commonplace to hear all managers assert that they enthusias- 
tically embrace adaptive management. Since it is assumed 
that adaptive management means little more than remaining 
flexible in the face of changing environmental threats or 
decision contexts, decision makers all readily claim that they 
have always embraced adaptive management. After all, who 
would claim a position of imperviousness to new knowledge, 
experience, or changing social and political contexts? It is 
further assumed that one size fits all problems--adaptive 
management suggests little difference to most decision 
makers than what they have always done. 
A more rigorous embrace of adaptive management, as 
outlined by serious thinkers such as Holling (1978), Walters 
(1986), and Lee (1993), suggests something quite different. 
Decisions are regarded as "experiments" rather than defini- 
tive solutions. Learning can be very difficult to achieve 
because of the tendency of most management systems to 
exhibit "path dependency" (Brown et al. 2007). Decision 
makers are prone to embark on a particular management 
direction or embrace a particular preferred solution, and, as a 
result, changes in basic thinking or approach become difficult 
to achieve (Kingdon 1995). Consequently, learning tends to 
be restricted to low-level learning induced by better data, and 
not basic rethinking of problems and approaches. 
There are institutional impediments as well, and they 
are more far-reaching and fundamental than is commonly 
assumed. In essence, they involve a lack of designs and 
mechanisms not only to encourage flexible management 
approaches but, more fundamentally, to promote and facili- 
tate social learning from experience. It has been widely noted 
that managers typically repeat errors rather than learn from 
them. In adaptation and reconstruction, basic vulnerabilities 
are often recreated, as the Katrina experience in New Orleans 
suggests (Kates et al. 2006). 
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To facilitate social learning from experience and other 
sources of knowledge, a diversity of inputs to the decision 
makers needs to be maximized (Social Learning Group 2001). 
Thus, the boundaries of the agency or organization need to be 
highly permeable and contrary or contested views not only 
accepted but actively sought out. The typical approach to 
critics and opponents of an agency plan is to isolate them as 
much as possible and to put them at the end in public involve- 
ment and communication initiatives. Adaptive management 
approaches require a major turnaround in these approaches. 
The strategy needs to engage critics and opponents from the 
outset. It must be understood that valuable things can be 
learned from such interactions, perhaps about the nature 
of the risks and related vulnerabilities, but surely about the 
issues that developers, regulators, and other decision makers 
will face across the table in public hearings, and (increasingly) 
in the courtroom. More importantly, developers and decision 
makers may come not only to understand better the issues of 
contention, but also to begin early to explore how opposing 
views may be negotiated where gaps may exist in the 
knowledge base assembled for those issues, or whether new 
monitoring systems may be needed. 
But also it is the case that, as technology moves to more 
mature stages of development, development agencies and 
corporations will face a broader range of issues associated 
with vulnerabilities, public concerns, risk communication, 
and public involvement. Accordingly, a wider range of exper- 
tise, which as yet may not have been brought into the deci- 
sion-making organizations, may be needed. 
Yet another issue relates to the management process itself 
in "go with the flow" adaptive management. This process 
calls for open acknowledgement of uncertainties that may 
limit the adoption of particular solutions and frank admission 
of errors that have occurred in past management choices. 
Adaptive management assumes evolutionary knowledge 
about environmental changes and risk (Jasanoff 2004; Lemos 
and Morehouse 2005). Reacting to this is an evolutionary 
development of management strategies in which decisions 
and solutions are incremental. Thus false starts and solutions 
at one point in time are expected to change and develop. This 
is in accord with what expertise would suggest. But two points 
are relevant. First, politically acknowledging uncertainties 
that are not well understood and errors that have occurred in 
past management strategies requires a degree of candor and 
openness that decision makers rarely have, and political prices 
are to be expected. Second, negative effects on social trust 
should be anticipated. After all, perceived competence is one 
of the major dimensions of social trust, and if doubts arise in 
major stakeholders and the public as to whether managers 
possess the needed competence and expertise, then erosion of 
trust in the managers might well be expected. This may well 
move decision making of all kinds to become more conten- 
tious and more conflicted, and threaten greater paralysis and 
delay than otherwise might occur. 
7 Responding to the RiskAt Hand 
The current rush to embrace adaptive management often 
proceeds with the assumption that "one size fits all." A sound 
approach to disaster management should begin with an 
inquiry into the nature of the disaster. "Learning by experi- 
ence" and "going with the flow" are attractive where uncer- 
tainties are especially large and the consequences accumulate 
over time. This is typically the case for natural disasters 
or climate change. But for disasters where uncertainties may 
be more limited and consequences abrupt and potentially 
catastrophic, a disaster management strategy that proceeds by 
learning from experience is less appropriate. So distinctions 
among disasters are essential--what is the nature of the 
disasters? What consequences to society and ecology may be 
involved? Learning and flexibility need not be lost but more 
reliance upon risk analysis may be needed, as informed by 
both analytical models and experience. 
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